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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Estate of

HARVARD L. WHEADON,
Deceased.

Case No. 15329

NATURE OF THE CASE
The petitioners Iris Jensen and Ellen Piercy, nieces of
the decedent Harvard L. Wheadon, filed a petition to admit a lost
will and existing codicil to probate.

They claim the provisions

of the purported lost will make them the sole beneficiaries of
the decedent's estate.

The petitioner - objectors, George Wheadon,

John Wheadon, and Bertha W. Tilbury, brothers and sister to the

decedent, objected to the petition of the nieces, and filed their
own petition claiming that the estate of the decedent should pass
~

the intestacy laws of the State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the
Petitioner-objectors George Wheadon, John Wheadon and Bertha W.
Tilbury and against the petitioners Iris Jensen and Ellen Piercy.
The trial court dismissed the petition of Iris Jensen and Ellen
?iercy to admit the purported lost will and existing codicil to
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probate.

The trial court also ordered the estate of Harvard

Wheadon to be distributed according to the intestacy statutes
of Utah in existence at the time of trial.

The court reserved

decision as to the appointment of an administrator or executor.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents George Wheadon, John Wheadon and

Bert~·

W. Tilbury seek affirmation of the trial court judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decedent, Harvard L. Wheadon (hereafter decedent)
died on April 14, 1976.

He never married and left no issue.

He

was survived by the respondents, George Wheadon, John Wheadon and
Bertha W. Tilbury, who are hi·s· brothers and sister.
brother, Melvin Wheadon, died in 1971.

Another

The appellants, Iris

Jensen and Ellen Piercy, are Melvin's daughters, and, of course,
the decedent's nieces.
No original will of the decedent could be found after
his death although a careful, diligent search was made for it.
The petitioners Jensen and Piercy introduced evidence
tending to show that Harvard L. Wheadon executed a will on or
about May 24, 1955 (hereafter 1955 Will).

That will was apr:iarentl'

prepared by an attorney, Everett Dahl, and witnessed by Mr. Dahl
and his wife.

In that will the decedent bequeathed all his

property to Melvin and also named Melvin as executor.
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Shortly

after Melvin's death, the decedent apparently executed a codicil
to the 1955 Will which codicil named Judy O. Burton and Sue O.
Bateman as executrices.
Evidence introduced at trial revealed that after Melvin's
death, decedent had some conflicts with Melvin's daughters.

Mrs.

Burton indicated that shortly after Melvin died, Harvard Wheadon
~ld

her he felt hurt by actions of Melvin's daughters (TR 3-15

through 3-17).

He wanted them to sell him Melvin's property and
(Tr 3-16).

felt badly when they would not.

In the latter part

of 1971, Harvard Wheadon told his sister he was hurt and feeling
badly because Iris Jensen and Ellen Piercy would not sell.
Tilbury recalled ".

Mrs.

(H]e complained all the time that he

didn't want to have anything to do with either one of them after
that."

(Tr 3-66).

Harvard Wheadon apparently mentioned the

mbject to Judy Burton as late as 1975 (Tr 3-18) .
The evidence introduced at trial was that the 1955 will
was delivered to the decedent.

Mr. Dahl testified his usual

practice in 1955 was to give the original will to a testator (Tr
1-23).

His testimony was:
"So, the best of my recollection is that he
(a testator) was given the original and my usual
procedure was to also give him a copy." Id.
Mr. Dahl had no recollection of deviating from this

usual procedure insofar as Harvard Wheadon was concerned (Tr 218) •
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Ann Dahl, Mr. Dahl's wife and former secretary, similvl
testified that Mr. Dahl's usual procedure in 1955 was to tell a

"II

testator he should keep his will in a safety deposit box or leave
it with the county clerk (Tr. 2-27).

This testimony corroborated

Dahl's own testimony that in 1955 he generally did not retain
his client's wills because at that time he did not have an adequa)
fireproof place in which to store wills

(Tr. 1-23).

Unless

specifically requested, Dahl did not keep the original will of
his clients in 1955.

Id.

There was no evidence that Harvard

Wheadon ever asked Mr. Dahl to keep the 1955 will.
There is however, additional evidence that the will was
delivered to the decedent.

In 1963 or 1964 Mr. Dahl and his

former partner decided to go their separate ways.

At that time a

complete inventory of wills was prepared which included not onl\'
original wills on file, but also copies of wills on file
5).

(Tr. 2-

From that inventory it was evident to Mr. Dahl that at least

as late as 1964, he did not have the original will of Harvard
Wheadon (Tr. 2-6).

Mr. Dahl's records do indicate he kept the

1971 codicil of Harvard Wheadon.
Dahl located that codicil.

After Mr. Wheadon's death, Mr.

However, he did not find the origiMl

1955 will--he only found an unsigned office copy of that document
(Tr. 2-8).
Harvard Wheadon maintained a safety deposit box at the
West Jordan Branch of First Security Bank of Utah.
renting that box on August 24, 1966.

He began

The decedent was the sole
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I

I
I

owner of the box and the only person entitled to enter it (Tr. 3-

27).

According to entrance tickets to that box, the decedent was

the only person to enter the box while he was alive

(Tr. 3-32).

The last time the decedent entered the box before his death was
on June 23, 1975

(Tr.

3-30).

The bank has no record of anyone

entering the box from that time until after Harvard Wheadon's
death (Id.)
None of the witnesses who appeared at trial testified
to having seen the original 1955 will after the date it was
signed.

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Dahl had any recollection of seeing

that document after May 24, 1955

(Tr.

2-19, 2-27).

The secretary

of Mr. Dahl who prepared the codicil never saw the 1955 will (Tr.

2-35).

And neither did Judy Burton (Tr. 3-21), nor Laurence Leak

(Tr. 3-39) ..

Similarly, John Wheadon and Bertha Tilbury denied

having knowledge of that will (Tr. 3-59; Answer of Bertha Tilbury
to petitioners' interrogatory nos. 1 through 3).
Judy Burton did testify that in the month prior to his
death she asked the decedent point-blank if he had a will.
stid the decedent replied:
(Tr. 3-2, 3-3).

She

"Yes, it's in my safety deposit box."

This evidence was not introduced as evidence

that Harvard actually had a will, but rather, counsel for the
nieces introduced it for the limited purpose of showing the
decedent's state of mind (Tr. 2-50, 2-51, 2-54 and 3-1).

In any

event nothing in that statement referred to the terms of the 1955

Will or equated the alleged will in the safety deposit box with
the 1955 Will.

The following colloquy appears in the transcript:
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Q.
Indeed, you specifically asked him, "Harv,
do you have a will?"

A.

I did.

Q.
And he said, as best you can recall, "Yes,
and I keep it in my safety deposit box."

A.
He said, "Yes, I have it; I keep it," or,
"!have it in my safety deposit box."
Q.
He didn't say, "I have an unsigned copy of
a codicil in the safety deposit box," did he?
A.

No.

Q.
He said he had a will.
he made that will; did he?

He didn't say when

A.

No, he didn't.

Q.

He didn't define the terms of that will?

A.

No, he never did.

Q.
Didn't say that in that will he left everythfr:I
to Melvin or his daughters?

A.

No, he didn't.

I

Q.
Just said generally, "I have a will and I keep i
it in my safety deposit box."

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.
No equation with that will with any will
executed in 1955; isn't that true?

A.
He did not mention what the will was or what
it contained.
(Tr. 3-19, lines 1 through 25)
Of crucial significance is the fact that within a few
days after Harvard's death, Judy Burton had the safety deposit
box examined and neither the original nor any copy of the 1955
will was there (Tr. 3-20).

The box contained an unsigned copy of
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i

~e

1971 codicil and some time certificates of deposits

J-20).

(Tr 3-11,

Mrs. Burton admitted that based upon what Harvard had

told her, she expected to find an original will in the box and
was surprised when none was there (Tr. 3-20, 3-21).
After he learned of the decedent's death, Mr. Dahl
undertook an exhaustive search for the 1955 will.
will inventory.

He checked his

He had his secretary physically inventory all

cills on file to see if by any chance Mr. Wheadon's will had been
misfiled (Tr. 2-9).

He, himself, personally inventoried all

wills in his possession (Id.).

He supervised a thorough search

of the decedent's home and went through all of his papers, drawers,

I cupboards and desks.

··I

I

Judy Burton testified that in this

search, contents of metal boxes were examined together with
papers in the kitchen and the bedroom.

, single drawer in the house;

They went through "every

[and] took everything out of every

"I

: I
1

drawer and cupboard."

(Tr.3-7).

Mr. Dahl continued his search by checking with the
secretary of his former partner to see if any will of decedent
was there (Tr. 2-10).

He contacted another attorney in Midvale

and checked the records of the Salt Lake County Court to see if
the will was there

(Id).

Finally, he directed Judy Burton to go

to First Security Bank and check the contents of the decedent's
safety deposit box @.). None of these efforts disclosed the
existence of any will of the decedent.
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Both Mr. Dahl and representatives of the bank denied
ever withholding the 1955 or any other will from the decedent.
(Tr 2-21, 3-32, 3-33).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT "IN EXISTENCE"

WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 75-3-26 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953 REFERS TO PHYSICAL AND NOT TO MERE LEGAL EXISTENCE.
At the time of Harvard Wheadon's death and at the time
of trial Section 75-3-26 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 containeci
the following language which governs this case:
"Proof of will lost or destroyed,
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed
will, unless the same is proved to have been in
existence at the time of the death of the testator
or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in
the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two credible witnesses."
(emphasis added)
The petitioners Wheadon and Tilbury contend that when
one reads the entire section of the statute, it is much more
probable that "in existence" means physical existence as
to mere existence in contemplation of law.

oppos~

If the statutory term

"in existence" does not require the physical presence of the
will, the statutory language about fraudulent destruction within
the testator's lifetime is gross surplusage.

A will could not

possibly be fraudulently destroyed during the testator's lifetime
if the actual testamentary document did not need to be produced.
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such a will, though not in actual existence would exist in contemplation of law and, thus, could not be fraudulently destroyed
within the testator's lifetime.

It is an obvious maxim of

statutory construction that a statute should be construed in such
a manner as to give effect to all its contents.

73 Am.Jur.2d

Statutes,§ 191, pp. 389-390.
From the plain language of Section 75-3-26 it is evident
that its contents have to do with the evidentary requirements of
proving a lost or destroyed will.

The statute says that physical

existence is not required if the will is shown to have been
fraudulently destroyed during the testator's life.

Otherwise,

there must be proof that the will was in actual existence when
the testator died.

Section 75-3-26 does not address itself to

revocation, but rather to evidentary sufficiency.

Section 75-3-

26 does not conflict with Section 75-1-19 which deals with revocation of wills since each statute has a different purpose.

Section

75-1-19 deals with how a will may be revoked--not with evidentary
questions of proof.

Section 75-3-26 deals not with the substan-

tive question of revocation, but rather with the minimum evidentary
conditions which must be shown before an alleged lost or destroyed
will could be admitted to probate.
55 Cal Rptr. 606, 608

See In re Estate of Strickman,

(1966).

Not only does the express language of the statute point
~

the conclusion that "in existence" means physical existence,

~t the only Utah case in point clearly assumes that "in existence"
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means the physical reality of the testamentary document at the
time of the testator's death.

In the decision In re Frandsen's

Will, 50 Utah 156, 167 Pac. 362 (1917), the Utah Supreme Court
interpreted the precursor of Section 75-3-26 and held that for
purposes of the will statutes, when the testatrix in that case
became insane, she was legally dead.

A will was shown to have

been in existence at the time the decedent lost her sanity.

And

since that will physically existed at the time of her insanity,
it also existed at the time of her death for proof of will purposes.
However, in order to get to the point that a testatrix's
insanity equals death for proof of will purposes, the court
assumed that "in existence", within the meaning of the statute,
meant physical existence.

The opinion contains the following

language:
"
[O]n July 19, 1900 the testatrix then of
sound and disposing mind and memory duly executed
the will last proposed for probate and . . . deposited the same with the County Clerk of Carbon
County; that thereafter and before any of the
other proposed wills were executed, the testatrix,
at least once, in the presence of one witness,
saw the will in the County Clerk's office, and she
then, and at other times according to the evidence,
expressed herself as being satisfied with its provisions; that the will was recorded in a book in
the county clerk's office by a young lady who held
some official position in said office; that the
will was last seen in the County Clerk's office
by the witnesses who testified at the hearing in
March, 1912, and its contents were then examined
by them." 50 Utah 160-161, 167 Pac:-aE 363
(emphasis added).

-10-
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"As we have seen the court found that on
July 5, 1911 and on June 27, 1912, the testatrix
'was not of sound mind or memory' and that she
then was 'incapacitated from making, executing
or-U"nderstanding a will.' We thus have a case
where the will in question was shown to have
existed some eight months after the testatrix
had become insane, as found and declared by the
court, which finding and declaration we have
seen is binding upon us and upon the parties in
interest." Id.
(emphasis added)
If all that were needed was that the will have legal
existence, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to emphasize
the physical existence of the 1900 will at and after the date the
testatrix became insane.

To counsel for the Wheadons and Mrs.

Tilbury it appears that the court in Frandsen took it for granted
that "in existence" meant physical presence.
That conclusion is buttressed by further language from
the Frandsen decision:
"Now in this case it is conclusively shown
that the will existed for a period of about
eight months after the testatrix became insane
and incapacitated from either making or revoking
a will. True, the testator continued her physical existence. Her mind, however, the one thing
necessary to make or revoke a will, was gone .
Id. at 165, 167 Pac. at 365. (emphasis added)
Again, if existence in contemplation of law were sufficient, the court would not have emphasized the actual physical
existence of the testamentary document itself.
spoken of the will in the past tense.

It would not have

If existence in contem-

Plation of law were all that were required, the court would have
regarded the will as a present and not a past item.

Based upon
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all the foregoing, it appears to counsel for the respondents

t~~

the court in Frandsen understood the "in existence'' as used in
the statute to mean physical existence.
The court in Frandsen indicated that the Utah precursm
of § 75-3-26 was similar to a California statute.

The most

recent California decisions these counsel have found construe "in
existence" in the California successor statute to mean physical
existence.

In re Estate of Lane, 7 Cal.App.3d 402, 86 Cal. Rptr.

620 (1970); In re Estate of Strickman, supra.
As counsel for the appellants argue in their brief, an
earlier California decision held that legal existence was sufficient.

In re Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 143 P.2d 689

(1943)~

However, Bristol was a 4-3 decision and Justice Traynor

wrote a stinging dissent which was cited with approval by the
later California decision in Strickman.
608.

Strickman, supra, at

In addition, Bristol has been criticized by at least one

California scholar.

Ferrier "Statutory Restrictions on Probate

of Lost Wills," 32 California Law Review 221,223.
If the later Calfornia decisions do not expressly
reverse Bristol, they at least announce a departure from it and
clearly set forth a physical existence criterion.
In Strickman, the third page of a will could not be
found, even though there was evidence that that page had originally been part of the will.

A substitute page, unexecuted by the '
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testatrix was located, however.

Witnesses identified the original

first two pages and a copy of the original page 3.
The California statute, Section 350 of the California
Probate Code provided:
"No will shall be proven as a lost or
destroyed will unless proved to have been in
existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or shown to have been destroyed
by public calamity, or destroyed fraudulently
in the lifetime of the testator, without his
knowledge; nor unless its provisions are
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses."
After reviewing with favor the Traynor dissent in
Bristol, the intermediate appellate court held:
"We have concluded that although the threepage will of 1962 was validly executed, page 3
thereof cannot be probated because it was no
longer in physical existence at the time of the
death of the testator." 55 Cal.Rptr. at 608.
(emphasis added)
In the decision In re Estate of Lane, supra, certain
claimants under a 1963 will attempted to have that will admitted
to probate.

The petitioners could not produce the original 1963

will, but had a copy which had been furnished by the attorney who
prepared it.

There was no evidence that the will was in existence

at the time of the testatrix's death.

The case arose under

Section 350 of the California Probate Code cited earlier.
The court affirmed a

sum.~ary

judgment against the 1963

will claimants, holding:
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"Insofar as lost or destroyed wills are
concerned, those requirements are specifically
spelled out in Probate Code Section 350.
The
words 'unless proved to have been in existence
at the time of the death of the testator' may
not be equated with proof the will has not been
revoked.
The word 'existence' used in the code
section means 'physical existence' rather than
'legal existence.'" Lane, supra, 86 Cal.Rptr.
at 622 (emphasis added) .
Another recent western state decision was In re Estate
of Newman, 518 P.2d 800 (Mont. 1974).

The applicable Montana

statute, Section 91-1202, R.C.M., 1947, provided:
"No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed
will, unless the same is proved to have been in
existence at the time of the death of the testator,
or is shown to have been fratldulently destroyed in
the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses."
In the course of the opinipn, the court cited its
earlier decision in In re Colbert's Estate, 31 Mont. 461, 471, 78
P.2d 971, 974:
"Now, as we have heretofore seen, the statute is
to the effect that the proponent of a lost will
must prove either that the will was actually in
existence at the time of the testator's death, or
that it is in existence in contemplation of law.
If it was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime,
it is still so in existence.
If appellant cannot
prove that the will was in existence, either
actually or in contemplation of the law, at the
time Colbert died, it follows that his case cannot stand." Newman, supra, at 802-803.
As is evident from the cited passage, Montana, like
California, requires physical existence except where the will is
shown to have been fraudulently destroyed during the testator's
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lifetime.

The existence in contemplation of law is not a blanket

of abandonment of the necessity for proof of the will's physical
existence at the time of the testator's death.

Rather, physical

existence is required except where the will is proved to have
been fraudulently destroyed during the testator's lifetime.
Other authorities could be cited, but respondents urge
that the plain language of the statute, the Frandsen decision,
and the cited California and Montana cases based on statutes
similar to section 75-3-26 all indicate that "in existence" means
physical existence.

As a matter of policy the legislature of this

state decided that lost or destroyed wills could only be proved
by showing one of two things:

1) fraudulent destruction during

the testator's life or 2) actual existence of the will after the
testator's death.

If the

proponen~

of a purported lost or destroyed

will cannot establish either fraudulent destruction or existence
at the time of death, the document cannot be probated.
For reasons set forth herein, it is urged that the
better reasoned cases in states having statute's similar to 75-3-

26 require physical existence.

The Frandsen decision seems to

adopt the physical existence standard as the law of this state
and the lower court properly applied that standard to the facts
in this case.

-15-
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POINT II.

THE PRESUMPTION THAT A WILL MISSING AT THE TIME OF THE

TESTATOR'S DEATH WAS DESTROYED BY HIM WITH INTENT TO REVOKE APPLIES
IN THIS CASE AND WAS UNREBUTTED.
The Frandsen decision cited earlier refers to the
following general rule:
"When it is shown that the testator made a
will, but that it could not be found at his death,
then, ordinarily, the presumption arises that he
himself destroyed it for the prupose of revoking
it before his death . . . . " Frandsen, supra, at
161-162, 167 Pac. at 363-365.
Although the court in Frandsen held that the presumption is overcome where the testator has left his will with
another and did not have access to it after its deposit and
before his death, Frandsen, supra, at 165, 167 Pac. at 355, the
general presumption does apply where the testator retained actual
control of or had easy access to the will at the time it was last
seen.

The court in Frandsen cited with approval language from

the case of Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653, where the New York
court wrote:
"If the will had remained in the custody of
the testator, or if it had appeared that, after
its execution he had access to it, the presumption of law would be from the fact that it could
not be found after his decease, that the same had
been destroyed by him . . . " 167 Pac. at 364.
The evidence introduced at trial compels the conclusion
that Harvard Wheadon either had or had access to the original
will after its execution.

The attorney who drafted the will

indicated his policy, at the time the original will was signed,
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was to leave the original with the testator, since at that time
the attorney did not have a fire-proof safe.

(Tr. 1-23, 2-18)

The will file of that attorney did not reflect any original will
kept by the attorney;

(Tr. 2-6, 2-7) only the codicil.

A diligent

search disclosed no will.
In their brief, appellants recognize the rule that
where "a will was last known to be in the testator's possession
and cannot be found after his death, the will is presumed to have
been destroyed with the intent to revoke
Brief p. 16.

Appellant's

Their only response is that the language of 75-3-26

makes the presumption conclusive.

This simply is not the case.

If a proponent of a lost or destroyed will can prove fraudulent
destruction of the will during the testator's lifetime, the
physical document need not be produced.

The problem the peti-

tioners have is they failed to prove any fraudulent destruction
during the testator's lifetime or the actual existence of the
will at the time of the decedent's death.
Though witnesses testified the decedent felt his affairs
were in order and remarked about the general advisability of
having a will, the only evidence wherein the decedent allegedly
specifically referred to the location of his will was in a conversation with Judy Burton when he told her the will was in his
safety deposit box.

(Tr. 3-2, 3-3)

It is to be emphasized that

this statement was introduced not to show that the decedent
actually had a will, but only to show his state of mind as to
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whether he thought he had a will (Tr. 2-50).

Of critical impor-

tance is that shortly after his death Mrs. Burton and others
looked in the box and found no 1955 will - only a copy of the
codicil.

Mrs. Burton indicated she was surprised when no

origin~

will was there.
The Bank records indicated that the decedent was the
only person who had access to the safety deposit box.

Prior to

his death no one but the decedent had been into the box.

The

decedent, however, had made rather frequent entries to the box
prior to his death.

There was no evidence that the decedent ever

claimed to have lost the original will or surrendered its custody
to third persons under circumstances where he was denied access
to it.

To the contrary, the evidence was clear that at least at

some time after its execution, the decedent had the will or had
access to it.
The petitioners Wheadon and Tilbury contend that the
better reasoned cases, which have considered the issue under
facts similar to those in this case, hold that alleged statements
of a testator prior to his death as to the existence of a will ~
not destroy the general presumption of revocation.
In re Casey's Estate, 127 N.J.Eq. 101, 11 A.2d 38
appeared that a testator made a will in 1937.

In the decision\

I

(1940), it

The testator took

the original will while his attorney kept an unexecuted copy.

On

frequent occasions thereafter the decedent-testator referred to
the 1937 will.

The last occasion he referred to the will was on
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i

February 5, 1938.

The following day, February 6, 1938, the

testator-decedent disappeared and was never seen alive again.
The coroner determined his death to have been on February 8,
1938, and the cause thereof suicide.

A diligent search for the

1937 will was unsuccessful.
The lower court held that the
" . . . proofs adduced were not sufficient to
rebut the presumption of revocation which arose
from the fact that deceased had possession of
the will; that the proofs did not exclude every
possibility of the destruction of the will by
the deceased himself; and that under the proofs
there was a possibility that deceased had destroyed his will animo revocandi between February
5, 1938 and the date of his death [citation
omitted]." 11 A.2d at 39.
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the
holding denying probate of the copy of the will.
In In re Rokofsky's Will, 111 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Surr.Ct.
1952), the decedent executed a 1948 will which could not be
located after her death.

One Miss Neuer, an attorney who drafted

the 1948 will, testified that a short time before the testatrix's
death she called Miss Neuer and indicated she lost the will while
babysitting, but expressed her intention that the property be
devised according to that will.

The attorney indicated she would

Prepare another will, but failed to do so before the decedent's
death.
The New York court referred to the rebuttable presumption
that where a will is shown once to have existed and to have been
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in the testator's possession, but cannot be found after his
death, it is presumed to have been revoked.

The court held:

"The evidence offered in behalf of the
petitioner consisted of the testimony of Miss
Neuer concerning statements by the decedent to
the effect that the December 4, 1948, will had
been lost and that the decedent believed that
certain of her relatives may have obtained
possession of it and destroyed it.
Such evidence is incompetent to establish the fact
that the will was not revoked during the decedent's lifetime [citations]." 111 N.Y.S.2d at
556.
The court concluded:
"The will of December 4, 1948 must be denied
probate as the petitioner has failed to show
either that the will was in existence at the
time of the decedent's death or was fraudulently
destroyed during her lifetime
." Id. at 557.
And see In re Duffill's Estate,

5~

P.2d 185 (Cal.App. 1936),

where the appellate court affirmed a decision of the trial court.
In that case the alleged continuous declarations of a testator
that he had a will which he kept in a metal strong box in his
home did not constitute a preponderance of evidence sufficient to
rebut the presumption of revocation when no will was found.
The presumption was unrebutted.

The petitioners Jenser.\

and Piercy failed to sustain their burden of proof.

And, conse- .

quently, the trial court correctly directed a verdict against
them.

-20-
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POINT III.

SINCE THE 1955 WILL IS PRESUMED DESTROYED AND REVOKED,

THE 1971 CODICIL IS ALSO REVOKED.
Since the appellants have failed to rebut the presumption that a missing will is presumed destroyed with intent to
revoke it, the 1955 will is presumed to be revoked.

Section 74-

1-30 of the Utah Code Annotated which was in effect at the time

of decedent's death and the time of trial provides:
"Revocation revokes codicils - The revocation of
a will revokes all its codicils."
Since the 1955 will is presumed revoked, its revocation
also revokes the 1971 codicil.
For reasons set forth above, respondents urge that the
presumed destruction of the 1955 will operated to revoke the 1971
codicil.
The lower court did not determine who was to be executor
or administrator of the decedent's estate.

Respondents urge that

the administrator should be appointed pursuant to the intestacy
statutes of Utah in effect at the time of decedent's death, since
both the 1955 will and the 1971 codicil are deemed to be revoked.
If, however, this court should determine that the 1971 codicil may
be probated, respondents urge it be admitted for the sole purpose
of naming the executrices.
intestacy.

Otherwise the estate should pass by

In re Sapery, 28 N.J. 599, 147 A.2d 777 (1959).
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POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFt:s:

PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS OF ALLEGED NEWt
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
On pages 4 through 7 of the appellants' brief and unde:
the heading of Statement of Facts, appellants refer to the
of two affidavits submitted after trial.

conte~:

Naturally, respondents

I

did not have the opportunity to cross-examine any of the affiant:
at trial, and respondents object to any use of the content of

1,

those affidavits except insofar as those affidavits are used in /
conjunction with appellant's alternative motion for a new trial.

I

Respondent's essential position is that the contents o:
the two affidavits do not raise material issues which would
justify a new trial.

And in any event, the information in the

affidavits was available to appellants long before trial.
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure lists I
as one ground for granting a new trial:
"(4}
Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at trial."
(emphasis added)
Appellants moved that the trial court order a new tria'.
on precisely the same grounds it urges this court so to order.
The trial court denied that motion.

A major legal encyclopedia

states as a general rule:
. Granting of a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence is within the sound
discretion of the court, not reviewable except
for a palpable abuse of discretion.
. " 5 Arn. Jur.
2d Appeal and Error, § 851, p. 295 (1962).
See
also Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 124, 247
P.2d 264, 265 (1952) where this Court wrote:
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I

. . A wide discretion is reposed in the
trial court in granting or denying a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence . . . . "
And see further Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3
Utah 2d 364,

284 P.2d 477, 478

(1955).

In Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 47, 57 Pac. 712 (1899),
the Utah Supreme Court wrote in an opinion dealing in part with a

motion for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence:
"The appellant contends that the court erred
in refusing to grant a new trial based upon the
affidavit of one Lamb because of newly discovered
evidence. The facts presented in this affidavit,
if true, would tend to impeach and contradict the
testimony of the plaintiff.
In some respects the
testimony is cumulative, and no reason is shown why
with reasonable diligence the witness Lamb could
not have been produced at the trial.
It is well
settled that to entitle a defeated party to a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
it must appear, 1st, that he used reasonable diligence to discover and produce at the former trial
the newly discovered evidence, and that his failure
to do so was not the result of his own negligence.
2d, That the newly discovered evidence is not simply
cumulative.
3d, That such evidence is not sufficient
if it simply be to impeach an adverse witness.
4th,
It must be material to the issues and so important
as to satisfy the court by reasonable inference that
the verdict or judgment would have been different
had the newly discovered evidence been introduced
on the former trial.
5th, That the defeated party
had no opportunity to make the defense, or was
prevented from doing so by unavoidable accident,
or the fraud or improper conduct of the other party
without fault on his part [citations omitted]."
Klopenstine, supra, at 55, 57 Pac. at 714
(emphasis addea:r:And a Tenth Circuit case, Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
172 F.2d 445

(10th Cir. 1949), contains the following language:
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"It also seems to be the general rule that in
the absence of unusual or extraordinary circumstances,
the trial court will not grant a new trial on newly
discovered evidence, which is intended to or has the
effect of discrediting or impeaching the testimony
of the movant's witnesses in the original trial
[citations omitted]. The cases are not agreed upon
what constitutes an unusual or extraordinary circumstance, but the manifest purpose of the rule is to
discourage new trials based upon afterthoughts,
while at the same time preserving the power of the
court to correct gross injustice or to rectify a
fraud.
[citations omitted]."
Id. at 445-446.
(emphasis added)
On page 38 of their brief the appellants recite:
"The evidence which is newly discovered
is that the objectors [Respondents] possibly
had access to the document which cannot be
found."
(emphasis added).
Of critical importance is that nowhere in any affidavi'. :
did the uncrossexarnined affiants ever claim to have seen John
Wheadon, Bertha Tilbury or Helen Sower with or looking for a
will.

Nowhere in any of the affidavits nor in any evidence

i

I
Hel~ I

produced at trial was there any suggestion that the decedent ever
kept the will in the kitchen cupboard.

Even if Bertha and

had gone through that cupboard looking for documents (and they

I

have denied removing any such documents Tr. 3-76, 3-77, 3-72), no I
evidence presented to date indicates the will was ever there.
Judy Burton, the appellant's own witness, said she thought the
alleged will was in the safety deposit box (Tr. 3-20).

She also

testified the decedent kept important papers in a tin box or
boxes in the cellar (Tr. 3-7).

And Judy Burton had the key to

the box or boxes containing those papers (Tr. 3-22).

In short

nothing in the affidavits contains any substantive evidence
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I
I

concerning the actual existence or location of the 1955 will as
of the date of the "cupboard incident."
Bertha Tilbury and Helen Sower were both examined by
counsel for the appellants at trial with respect to the alleged
cupboard search.

John Wheadon was also subject to appellant's

cross-examination generally.
Answer

As early as August 5, 1976, in

to Interrogatory No. 2 of respondents' first set of

interrogatories, appellants suggested that respondents "possibly
had access to the documents which cannot be found."
Brief p. 38.

Appellant's

Answers to Interrogatories by Mrs. Tilbury indicated

that the Shepards and Grant Palmer were in the house when Bertha,
John and Helen were.

All this information was available to

Jensen and Piercy well before the trial date.

There is no indi-

cation that Mr. Palmer was unavailable at the time of triai.
attempt was made to have the deposition of the Shepards

No

taken

prior to trial, nor was a motion made to postpone the trial
because their absence would prejudice Mrs. Piercy's and Mrs.
Jensen's case.

See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, supra.

At trial counsel for appellants presented a thorough,
effective and lawyerlike exposition of their case.

That presen-

tation emphasized the alleged legal existence of the will.
Having lost on that theory, the appellants now wish to pursue a
new theory, i.e. the possible disappearance of the will after the
decedent's death.

The purported facts contained in the affidavits
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of the Shepards and Mr. Palmer filed after the trial are not
illuminative as to the whereabouts of the 1955 will.

At best,

those affidavits only attack the credibility and ability to
recall of John Wheadon, Bertha Tilbury and Helen Sower.
The respondents urge that the alleged newly discovered
evidenc_e is not "new."

Even if it were, it could have been

discovered ~{th reasonabi~ diligence on the part of Mrs. Jensen
and Mrs. Piercy prior to trial.

In any event, the allegations in

the Affidavits do not raise issues which justify holding a new
trial.

I
/

Those allegations merely attack credibility of witnesses \

and require the broadest speculative leaps before they have any
evidentiary value.

The motion for new trial on grounds of newly

discovered evidence should be denied.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that "in existence"
within the meaning of Section 75-3-26 of the Utah Code requires
proof of actual physical existence at the time of the testator's
death.
The appellants failed at trial to rebut the presumption
.I

that a will missing at the time of the testator's death is presume: I
I

destroyed by him with intent to revoke.
Since the 1955 will is presumed destroyed and revoked,
the 1971 codicil is also revoked.
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_......I

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to grant a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and DATED this

~

day of

November, 1977.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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